psychology.games

Hall I · Formal Games & Decision Structures

Ultimatum game

Station · Playable

The responder is a scripted simulation, not a person. Its acceptance rule is visible before you play, and refusals cost both sides everything.

Each round you split 10 points. You propose a division; the scripted responder accepts (the split happens) or refuses (both of you get nothing).

Round 1 of 10 · your points: 0 · partner: 0

The experience

Ten points on the table, ten rounds. You play the proposer: each round you pick a split of the 10 points between yourself and a scripted responder, who can only accept — the split happens — or reject, in which case you both get nothing that round. The responder's acceptance rule is on display before you start, so the real question is how much you think a fair-minded counterpart will tolerate. It helps to know the baseline first: in the ultimatum game, one player proposes how to split a sum of money and the other can only accept or reject — rejection means both walk away with nothing. Across hundreds of experiments, proposers most often offer an equal split, average offers sit around 40-50% of the pie, and offers below roughly 20% are rejected so often that acceptance rates approach zero.Convergent / replicated

What is happening

The strangeness sits on the responder's side of the table. Turning down a low offer costs the responder real money, and textbook game theory predicts people should accept any positive amount while proposers offer the bare minimum. Instead, people routinely reject lowball offers, and brain-imaging work links those rejections to emotional reactions — evidence that responders compare their share to the proposer's and react to unfairness, not just to their own payoff.Supported, with limits As proposer, you are bargaining with that fact: every offer you make is a bet on how much unfairness the other side will swallow before punishing you both.

What this shows

What might look like a quirk of laboratory students turns out to be far broader — though not identical everywhere. Fairness behavior in this game is a human regularity but not a single universal constant. In experiments across 15 small-scale societies, the pure self-interest model failed everywhere, yet offers and rejections varied across groups more than in earlier research, with differences tracking features of everyday economic life such as market integration; a separate meta-analysis likewise found regional differences, specifically in responder behavior.Supported, with limits The station above gives that regularity a shape you can feel: try the 9–1 split against the default responder and watch what a "rational" lowball actually earns.

What this does not show

One round of this game does not measure a person's generosity or sense of fairness as a stable trait. Offers and rejections shift with the size of the stakes, how choices are collected, players' experience, and whether roles were earned rather than assigned — and even the game's inventor notes that individual behavior in it still cannot be predicted from observable characteristics.Supported, with limits So read your session summary as a record of what you tried against one scripted rule, in one sitting, for points — not as a verdict on what kind of person you are. The site draws no such conclusion.

Research and limitations

The ultimatum game was introduced in experiments run at the University of Cologne and published in 1982 by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze. The finding that people systematically deviate from the standard money-maximizing prediction influenced a generation of researchers and made this one of the most replicated paradigms in behavioral economics, with thousands of follow-up experiments.Historical / descriptive

One caveat matters especially here. Playing against a disclosed computer opponent is not the same as facing a person. When people knew offers were computer-generated, the bodily stress response that normally accompanies unfair offers — and predicts rejecting them — appeared only for offers from real humans, not from computers. A version of the game with an openly simulated responder can demonstrate the logic, but it should not be expected to evoke or measure the full social reaction.Supported, with limits Treat a session here as a way to explore the game's structure from the proposer's chair; where the research is silent — including exactly how a simulated responder changes the proposer's side of the experience — we make no claims. The evidence base is overwhelmingly laboratory experiments, with the cross-cultural fieldwork described above the notable exception.

Research drawer — claims, sources and limits

Every highlighted claim above is recorded here with its evidence grade and sources. Grades are per claim; this site never computes an overall truth score.

↩ in the ultimatum game, one player proposes how to split a sum of money and the other can only accept or reject — rejection means both walk away with nothing. Across hundreds of experiments, proposers most often offer an equal split, average offers sit around 40-50% of the pie, and offers below roughly 20% are rejected so often that acceptance rates approach zero.

Convergent / replicated

Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014). More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 108, 396-409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Read full author-manuscript PDF (QUT eprints / Jena working paper 2013-035). Section 3 states the modal equal-split offer is 'an extremely robust phenomenon', that players on average offer around 40-50% of the pie in the standard game, that such offers are almost always accepted, and that acceptance rates 'approach zero quite quickly for offers below 20%'.

Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & van de Kuilen, G. (2004). Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171-188. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Full abstract read via EconPapers/RePEc: meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results; on average proposers offer 40% of the pie and 16% of offers are rejected.

↩ Turning down a low offer costs the responder real money, and textbook game theory predicts people should accept any positive amount while proposers offer the bare minimum. Instead, people routinely reject lowball offers, and brain-imaging work links those rejections to emotional reactions — evidence that responders compare their share to the proposer's and react to unfairness, not just to their own payoff.

Supported, with limits

Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014). More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 108, 396-409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Read full PDF. Lays out the subgame-perfect prediction (proposer receives nearly all of the pie, responder at most the smallest positive amount); states rejection of positive offers 'clearly questions material opportunism and cannot be explained by noise, mistakes, or confusion', and that responders 'compare their payoff with that of the proposer and become frustrated when their share is much lower'.

Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 300(5626), 1755-1758. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1082976 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Official abstract read via PubMed (PMID 12805551): unfair offers elicited activity in emotion-related (anterior insula) and cognitive (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) areas, and heightened anterior-insula activity for rejected unfair offers 'suggests an important role for emotions in decision-making'.

↩ Fairness behavior in this game is a human regularity but not a single universal constant. In experiments across 15 small-scale societies, the pure self-interest model failed everywhere, yet offers and rejections varied across groups more than in earlier research, with differences tracking features of everyday economic life such as market integration; a separate meta-analysis likewise found regional differences, specifically in responder behavior.

Supported, with limits

Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., et al. (2005). "Economic man" in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(6), 795-815. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16372952/ · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Official abstract read via PubMed eutils: the canonical self-interest model 'fails in all of the societies studied'; there is 'substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research'; group-level differences in economic organization and social interaction structure (e.g., market integration, payoffs to cooperation) explain a substantial portion of the variation.

Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & van de Kuilen, G. (2004). Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171-188. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Abstract read via EconPapers: the meta-analysis finds differences across geographical regions in responder behavior (not proposer behavior), and these differences are generally not explained by standard cultural classification systems (Hofstede, Inglehart).

↩ One round of this game does not measure a person's generosity or sense of fairness as a stable trait. Offers and rejections shift with the size of the stakes, how choices are collected, players' experience, and whether roles were earned rather than assigned — and even the game's inventor notes that individual behavior in it still cannot be predicted from observable characteristics.

Supported, with limits

Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & van de Kuilen, G. (2004). Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171-188. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Abstract read via EconPapers: offers are smaller with larger pie sizes and larger under the strategy method or with inexperienced subjects; rejection rates are lower for larger pies and bigger offered shares and differ under the strategy method — i.e., the same person's behavior depends systematically on procedure and context.

Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014). More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 108, 396-409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Read full PDF: states researchers 'still do not understand everything and, especially, cannot predict individual behavior in the ultimatum game, based on observables'; behavior is 'very heterogeneous across decision makers'; and entitlement manipulations (auctioning roles, quiz-based role assignment) shift offers from equal splits toward roughly one-third of the pie.

↩ Playing against a disclosed computer opponent is not the same as facing a person. When people knew offers were computer-generated, the bodily stress response that normally accompanies unfair offers — and predicts rejecting them — appeared only for offers from real humans, not from computers. A version of the game with an openly simulated responder can demonstrate the logic, but it should not be expected to evoke or measure the full social reaction.

Supported, with limits

van 't Wout, M., Kahn, R. S., Sanfey, A. G., & Aleman, A. (2006). Affective state and decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Experimental Brain Research, 169(4), 564-568. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16489438/ · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Official abstract read via PubMed eutils: in 30 students, skin conductance activity was higher for unfair offers and associated with rejecting them, and 'this pattern was only observed for offers proposed by human conspecifics, but not for offers generated by computers'.

Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 300(5626), 1755-1758. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1082976 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Abstract read via PubMed: participants played against both human and computer partners in the design, and emotional brain responses tracked unfair offers and rejections. Note: the widely cited finding that unfair offers from humans were rejected more often (and evoked stronger insula activity) than identical offers from computers is in the paper body, which I could not open; the abstract alone does not state the human-vs-computer comparison.

↩ The ultimatum game was introduced in experiments run at the University of Cologne and published in 1982 by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze. The finding that people systematically deviate from the standard money-maximizing prediction influenced a generation of researchers and made this one of the most replicated paradigms in behavioral economics, with thousands of follow-up experiments.

Historical / descriptive

Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367-388. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · citation only
Support note: This is the original publication of the first ultimatum game experiments. Bibliographic details (journal, volume 3, issue 4, pages 367-388, December 1982) verified against RePEc/IDEAS and Semantic Scholar records (4,748 citations recorded); the full text itself could not be opened (ScienceDirect returned 403; RePEc lists no abstract).

Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014). More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 108, 396-409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · accessed 2026-08-16
Support note: Read full PDF: recounts first-hand how the 1982 study was funded (a 1977 Cologne workshop grant of 1,000 German marks) and run with students Schmittberger and Schwarze; notes the original article had over 2,650 Google Scholar citations at writing, that 'an entire generation' of researchers was influenced by the result that people systematically deviate from the standard prediction, and that thousands of ultimatum experiments have since been published.